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The importance of reliability to complex systems cannot be disputed as they are the
backbones of our society. In practice, the common cause failures may have severe reverse
function on complex systems’ overall stability. Survival Signature opens a new way to
perform reliability analysis on systems with multiple component types. This paper takes
a research on survival signature based reliability analysis on complex systems susceptible
to Common Cause Failures. To be specific, it proposes the standard α-factor model and
general α-factor model to combine with the survival signature. In practical applications,
the α-factor estimator of the system might not be defined completely due to limited data,
or knowledge which requires to take imprecision into account. Some numerical cases are
presented to show the applicability of the methods for complex systems. In addition,
this paper may attract people’s attention on the conception of Design for Reliability.
Keywords: Common Cause Failures; Survival Signature; α-Factor Model; Reliability
Analysis; Complex Systems.
1. Introduction
A common cause failure (CCF) is an event that causes multiple components fail
simultaneously, which exists widely in complex systems. Modelling CCFs is essen-
tial in complex systems reliability analysis as they can have a large effect on the
systems’ overall functionality, especially on the quality and productivity of prod-
ucts and processes.1 There is always an assumption that the components failures
are independent, however, CCFs make the hypothesis is not set up. What is more,
CCFs have been shown by many studies to decrease the reliability and availabil-
ity of complex systems. Therefore, common cause failures are extremely important
in reliability assessment and must be given adequate treatment to minimize gross
overestimation of performances.2
A number of parametric models have been developed for common cause fail-
ures over the last decades. Rasmuson and Kelly reviewed the basic concepts of
modelling CCFs in reliability and risk studies.3 One of the most commonly used
1
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single parameter models defined by Fleming4 is called the β-factor model, which
is the first parameter model applied to common cause failures in risk and relia-
bility analysis. Then he generalized the β-factor model to multiple Greek letter
model in 1986.5 The α-factor model which is proposed by Mosleh et al.6,7 devel-
ops CCFs from a set of failure ratios and the total component failure rate. The
binomial failure rate model discussed by Atwood8 estimates the failure frequency
of two or more components in a redundant system as the product of the CCF shock
arrival rate and the conditional failure probability of components given the shock
has occurred. A system’s components each contribute differently to the system,
which are defined as weights.9 Systems with weighted components are useful to
model various capacity-based engineering systems such as oil transportation sys-
tem, power generation system, and production system.10 Different from weighted
reliability components measure, which mainly focus on the influence of different
weighted components on the reliability of system, α-factor model is mainly used for
estimating the probability of how many components fail due to a common cause
failure event.
Recently, based on the α-factor model, Kelly and Atwood11 presented a method
for developing Dirichlet prior distributions that have specified marginal means, but
which are otherwise minimally informative. An explicit method and an implicit
method is proposed in12 to analyse the reliability of systems subject to internal
or external probabilistic common cause failures. A general applicable and effiecient
Monte Carlo simulation approach is used for reliability evaluation of systems sus-
ceptible to induced failures in.13 Levitin14 incorporated the common cause faliures
into non-repairable multistate series-parallel system analysis by using the universal
generating function method. A robust Bayesian approach to modelling epistemic
uncertainty in the imprecise Dirichlet model has been discussed by Troffaes et
al.15 Coolen and Coolen-Maturi16 presents non-parametric predictive inference for
system reliability following common cause failures of components. In that paper,
attention is restricted to system with exchangeable or a single type of components.
Therefore, an extension of this work is needed. To be specific, it is necessary to
perform reliability analysis on complex systems by considering CCFs among com-
ponents belonging to different types. Survival signature provides a good way solve
this problem.
Survival signature was first proposed by Coolen and Coolen-Maturi17 in 2012.
It is a powerful methodology that can not only hold the merits of the former sys-
tem signature,18 but can be used in complex system with components belong to
multiple types. In essence, it does not have the assumption that components of dif-
ferent types are exchangeable, which overcomes the long-standing limitation of the
system signature. This is useful when a system which may have components with
failure times that follow different probability distributions.19,20 Therefore, survival
signature is a promising method for application to complex systems and networks.
Based on the former work, Aslett developed a Reliability Theory package which
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was used to calculate the survival signature21 and analysed system reliability within
the Bayesian framework of statistics.22 A non-parametric predictive inference for
system reliability using the survival signature was proposed by Coolen et al.23 Feng
et al. deals with the imprecision within the system by analytical and numerical
ways respectively,24 what is more, probability bounds analysis is used to perform
sensitivity analysis on complex systems with epistemi uncertainty in the paper.25
An imprecise Bayesian non-parametric approach by using sets of priors to system
reliability with multiple types of components is developed by Walter et al.26 Patelli
et al.27 proposed efficient simulation approaches which are based on survival sig-
nature for reliability analysis on large system. An efficient algorithm for the exact
computation of the survival signature of large systems was put forward by Reed.28
Eryilmaz et al.29 developed the survival signature-based marginal and joint reli-
ability importance measures to optimise system design, as well as consider mean
residual life of coherent systems with multiple types of dependent components in
the article.30
A survival signature based reliability analysis on complex systems with common
cause failures has been proposed in this paper. The α-factor model distinct between
the total failure rate of a component and the common cause failures modelled by
α-factor parameters, which can be got through experts’ judgement of the system
or the past data on the system. These advantages of the α-factor model make
it possible to combine with the survival signature to assess the complex system
reliability. The standard α-factor model is proposed first in the paper to perform
system reliability analysis after CCFs, however, it has two assumptions that there
must be at least one component fails of each type and the components failures of
each type are independent. In order to remove these assumptions, another general
α-factor model has been introduced. It takes all the possible combinations of the
failed numbers of past events. The novel standard and general α-factor models can
be expressed by the equations which connect with the survival signature. What
is more, the imprecision within the models are also considered. The applicability
of the proposed approaches are demonstrated by solving the numerical cases, by
investigating the results, the concept of design for reliability should be drawn more
attention.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief conceptions about the
α-factor model and survival signature. The system reliability analysis after common
cause failures has been presented in Section 3. In this Section, the standard α-
factor model and the general α-factor model have been studied respectively. The
applicability and performance of the proposed approaches is presented in Section
4. Finally Section 5 closes the paper with conclusions and discussion.
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2. α-Factor Model and Survival Signature
2.1. α-factor model
The α-factor model is particularly useful in the practical engineering world as the
alpha factor parameters can be got through experts’ judgement of the system or
past data on the system. The parameters αk of the model are the fractions of the
total probability of failure in the system that involves the failure of k components
due to a common cause.
The probability of a common cause basic event involving failure of k components
in a system of m components31 can be calculated by Equation 1.
Qk =
k(
m−1
k−1
) αk
αt
Qt (1)
where, k = 1, 2, ...,m and αt =
∑m
k=1 kαk. Qt is the total probability of failure
accounting both for common cause failures and independent failures. The alpha
parameter estimator can be expressed as:
αk =
nk∑m
i=1 ni
(2)
where, nk is the number of events with k failed components.
The alpha parameter estimator represents the probability that exactly k of the
m components fail, given that at least one failure occurs. It can be seen from
Equation 2 that the sum of the αk will be 1. The advantage of the α-factor model
is its distinction between the total failure rate of a component Qt, for which we
generally have a lot of information, and common cause failures modelled by αk, for
which we generally have very little information.15
2.2. Survival signature
Suppose there is a system with m components which belong to K ≥ 2 compo-
nent types, with mk components of type k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K} and
∑K
k=1mk = m.
Assume that the random failure times of components of the system type are ex-
changeable, while full independence is assumed for components belong to different
types (iid), Coolen17 proposed the survival signature which can be denoted by
Φ(l1, l2, ..., lK), with lk = 0, 1, ...,mk for k = 1, 2, ...,K. It defines the probabil-
ity that the system functions given that lk of its mk components of type k work,
for each k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}. There are (mklk ) state vectors xk with ∑mki=1 xki = lk
(k = 1, 2, ...,K), where xk = (xk1 , x
k
2 , ..., x
k
mk
). Let Sl1,l2,...,lK denote the set of all
state vectors for the whole system, and it can be known that all the state vec-
tors xk ∈ Sklk are equally likely to occur. Therefore, the survival signature can be
expressed as:
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Φ(l1, ..., lK) = [
K∏
k=1
(
mk
lk
)−1
]×
∑
x∈Sl1,...,lK
φ(x) (3)
Let Ck(t) ∈ {0, 1, ...,mk} denote the number of k components working at time t.
Assume that the components of type k have a known cumulative distribution func-
tion (CDF ) Fk(t) and the components failure times of different type are assumed
independent, then:
P (
K⋂
k=1
{Ck(t) = lk}) =
K∏
k=1
P (Ck(t) = lk) =
K∏
k=1
(
mk
lk
)
[Fk(t)]
mk−lk [1− Fk(t)]lk (4)
Hence, the survival function of the system with K types of components becomes:
P (Ts > t) =
m1∑
l1=0
...
mK∑
lK=0
Φ(l1, ..., lK)P (
K⋂
k=1
{Ck(t) = lk}) (5)
Equation 5 shows that the structure of the system is separated from the its
components failure times, which is the typical advantage of the survival signature.
The survival signature is a summary of structure functions and only needs to be
calculated once for the same system. As a result, it is an efficient method to perform
system reliability analysis on complex systems with multiple component types.
3. System Reliability after Common Cause Failures
In this section, the survival signature is introduced to analyse complex system with
common cause failures. Based on the results of,16 the α-factor model can be applied
to calculate system reliability in the presence of common cause failures.
3.1. Standard α-factor model
Let assume that there is a system with mk components belong to type k ∈
{1, 2, ...,K}. When a failure event occur, P (f1, f2, ..., fK) denotes the probabil-
ity that how many failures occur of each component type. The survival signature
Φ(l1, l2, ..., lK) is the probability that the system functions if lk components of type
k are working, which can be expressed as Φ(l1, l2, ..., lK) = P (system functions |
lk components of type k work), where k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}.
Let P (Ts > t | CCF ) express the probability that the system still functions
after the next common cause failure event, therefore, it can be calculated by
P (Ts > t | CCF ) =
m1∑
l1=0
...
mK∑
lK=0
Φ(l1, ..., lK)P (m1 − l1, ...,mK − lK) (6)
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where fi = mi − li.
It can be seen from Equation 6 that unlike the P (Ts > t) calculated by Equa-
tion 5, the survival function of the system after the CCFs is independent of t.
What is more, the typical merit of survival signature can also hold. To be specific,
the survival signature, which encompasses information of the system structures,
and the probability distribution, which relies on the common cause failures of the
components belong to different types, is separated in the equation.
The α-factor model with estimate of the alpha factor parameters are mainly
used in this section. And they are given by Equation 2 for a common cause group
of m components.
P (f1, f2, ..., fK) is constructed by using the past data available on the system,
combined with the α-factor model for CCFs. For this standard α-factor model,
there are assumptions that P (0, 0, ..., 0) = P (0, f2, ..., fK) = P (f1, 0, ..., fK) = ... =
P (f1, f2, ..., 0) = 0, as there must be at least one component fails of each type. What
is more, there is another assumption that the components failures of each type are
independent, which implies that P (f1, f2, ..., fK) = P (f1) ∗ P (f2) ∗ ... ∗ P (fK).
Recall that αknk gives the probability that exactly nk components fail, given
that they belong to type k. For example, it is assumed that there is 1 component
of type 1 failure, it follows that P (f1 = 1) = α
1
1. Thus, the alpha parameters
provide all of the information required to specify the distribution. For instance,
P (1, 1, ..., 1) = α11α
2
1...α
K
1 .
The next step is to calculate the survival signature, which will then combine
with the P (f1, f2, ..., fK) to assess the survival function of the system. It is not
necessary to computer all the survival signatures as it can identify which values are
required by Equation 6.
3.2. General α-factor model
The standard α-factor model may lead to an unsatisfactory low probability level of
the system reliability, which due to the assumption that the first failure event will
affect components of all types. Therefore, it is essential to find a general α-factor
model that can avoid the assumption that the failure event has necessarily affected
all common cause groups of components.
Let assume there are K common cause component groups, with group k ∈
{1, 2, ...,K} includes mk components. The past data nj1,j2,...,jK denotes the number
of past events with exactly j1 failed components from group 1, exactly j2 failure
components from group 2 and the like.
The α-factor parameter αj1,j2,...,jK provides the probability that exactly jk com-
ponents of group k fail due to a common cause failure event, with k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}.
Given that a common cause failure event has affected the overall system, how-
ever, which exact common cause groups are affected are not known. Therefore, the
αj1,j2,...,jK can be estimated by Equation 7.
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αj1,...,jK =
nj1,...,jK
(
∑m1
j1=0
...
∑mK
jK=0
nj1,...,jK )− n0,...,0
(7)
The
∑m1
j1=0
...
∑mK
jK=0
nj1,...,jK in denominator represents all the possible out-
comes, but n0,...,0 has to be subtracted as there has an assumption that at least
one component of type k in the system is affected by the common cause failure
event. However, this assumption is only valid if n0,...,0 is included in the summa-
tion. In practice, there may be no data for the number of no components have
failed, therefore, for this circumstance, n0,...,0 is arbitrarily setted as 0.
The probability of the system works after a common cause failure event can also
be expressed by Equation 6. The survival signature Φ(l1, ..., lK) will not change for
the same system, as it only depends on the structures of the system. However, the
joint probability distribution P (f1, f2, ..., fK) is obtained without assuming inde-
pendence among components, as it is simply given by the alpha factor parameters.
To be specific, that means P (f1, f2, ..., fK) = αj1,j2,...,jK .
3.3. Imprecise system reliability after common cause failures
In the application engineering world, if the system has not been in operation in the
past (e.g., is a new system), or it does not usually encounter common cause failure
events. All of which means there may not be enough data or perfect inspections to
estimate the values of the accurate α-factor parameters.32 In addition, experts can
provide a estimation of the number nk of common cause components failures, but
often only an interval is predicted.
Therefore, the α-factor parameters might have imprecise values with [αkmk , α
k
mk
].
Since P (f1, f2, ..., fK) is estimated based on the α-factor model, the imprecision will
propagate to P (m1 − l1, ...,mK − lK). The survival signature remains unaffected
by the imprecision since it is only influenced by uncertainty and imprecision in the
system structure. Hence, the bounds of the survival probability are calculated as
P (SCCF ) =
m1∑
l1=0
...
mK∑
lK=0
Φ(l1, ..., lK)P (m1 − l1, ...,mK − lK) (8)
P (SCCF ) =
m1∑
l1=0
...
mK∑
lK=0
Φ(l1, ..., lK)P (m1 − l1, ...,mK − lK) (9)
4. Numerical Examples
Figure 1 shows a complex system with thirteen components which belong to four
types.
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48
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2
Fig. 1. Complex system with thirteen components which belong to four types. The number inside
the component box represents the type, while the number outside the box expresses the component
index.
4.1. Case 1: standard α-factor model
Firstly, let determine the values of the survival function by using the standard
α-factor model with past data on the complex system. Suppose that the common
cause failure groups are the same as component types, this is logical in engineering
world as the components of the same type have similar characteristics, therefore,
they are more likely to be influenced by the same common cause event.
There have n1 = 1, n2 = 2, n3 = 1 for component type 1. For example, n1 = 1
means that there has been 1 previous occurrences of failure with just one component
of type 1. So the α-factor parameter estimator in this case is
α11 =
n1
n1 + n2 + n3
=
1
4
(10)
It can also get the results that α12 =
1
2 and α
1
3 =
1
4 in the same way. Just as the
said before in this paper, it can be seen the summation of the α-factor parameters
is equal to 1.
For type 2, n1 = 2, n2 = 1, n3 = 1 and n4 = 2, which gives α
2
1 =
1
3 , α
2
2 =
1
6 ,
α23 =
1
6 and α
2
4 =
1
3 respectively.
There are n1 = 2 and n2 = 1 for type 3. Thus, α
3
1 =
2
3 and α
3
2 =
1
3 .
Similarly for component type 4, the data of n1 = 3, n2 = 3, n3 = 1 and n4 = 1
lead to α41 =
3
8 , α
4
2 =
3
8 , α
4
3 =
1
8 and α
4
4 =
1
8 .
There has an assumption that a common cause failure event occur will affect at
least one component of each component type for the standard α-factor model, there-
fore, it can be known for this system that P (0, 0, 0, 0) = P (0, b, c, d) = P (a, 0, c, d) =
P (a, b, 0, d) = P (a, b, c, 0) = 0, for a = 1, 2, 3, b = 1, 2, 3, 4, c = 1, 2 and d = 1, 2, 3, 4.
October 22, 2018 13:5 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ws-ijrqse
Survival Signature Based Reliability Approach for Complex Systems Susceptible to Common Cause Failures 9
There is another assumption that the failure components of different types are
independent, which implies that P (f1, f2, f3, f4) = P (f1)P (f2)P (f3)P (f4). Accord-
ing to the conception, P (f1, f2, f3, f4) is calculated by the available past data on
the system, and is combined with the α-factor model for common cause failures.
Recall that α11 represents the probability that exactly one component of the
three components of type 1 failure. Since it has been assumed that one component
of type 1 fails, it follows that P (f1) = α
1
1. So the alpha parameters provide all the
information that required to specify the distribution. For instance, P (1, 1, 1, 1) =
α11α
2
1α
3
1α
4
1 =
1
4 ∗ 13 ∗ 23 ∗ 38 = 148 .
Then, it is necessary to calculate the survival signature Φ, which is used to
combine with the P (f1, f2, f3, f4) to assess the survival probability of the system.
For P (1, 1, 1, 1), its corresponding survival signature is Φ(2, 3, 2, 3), which means
that probability of the system works given that exact 2 components of type one, 3
components of type two, 2 components of type three and 3 components of type four
are working. There are altogether 48 possible state vectors, of which 41 combinations
allow the system to function. Therefore, Φ(2, 3, 2, 3) = 4148 .
All the values of P (f1, f2, f3, f4) and their corresponding survival signature
Φ(m1 − f1,m2 − f2,m3 − f3,m4 − f4) can be calculated. Based on the values and
Equation 6, the probability that the complex system works after the next common
cause failure event P (Ts > t | CCF ) is 50139 .
4.2. Case 2: general α-factor model 1
Let continue use the complex system in Figure 1, however, without assuming
that the common cause event will affect all the common cause failure groups. Again,
the component types form the common cause failure groups as before. Therefore,
it can be any number combinations of the components from type 1 to type 4. Note
again that P (0, 0, 0, 0) = 0 as at least one component will be affected by the CCFs.
The past data on the system can be seen in Table 1, which has more data
available to fit the requirements for implementing the general α-factor model.
Table 1: Past data nj1j2j3j4 on the system in Figure 1
nj1j2j3j4 nj1j2j3j4 nj1j2j3j4 nj1j2j3j4 nj1j2j3j4 nj1j2j3j4
n0001 = 1 n0002 = 1 n0003 = 1 n0004 = 1 n0010 = 1 n0011 = 1
n0012 = 1 n0013 = 1 n0014 = 1 n0020 = 1 n0021 = 1 n0022 = 1
n0023 = 1 n0024 = 1 n0100 = 1 n0101 = 1 n0102 = 3 n0103 = 1
n0104 = 1 n0110 = 1 n0111 = 1 n0112 = 1 n0113 = 1 n0114 = 1
n0120 = 1 n0121 = 1 n0122 = 1 n0123 = 1 n0124 = 2 n0200 = 1
n0201 = 1 n0202 = 1 n0203 = 1 n0204 = 1 n0210 = 1 n0211 = 2
n0212 = 1 n0213 = 1 n0214 = 1 n0220 = 1 n0221 = 1 n0222 = 1
n0223 = 1 n0224 = 1 n0300 = 1 n0301 = 1 n0302 = 1 n0303 = 1
n0304 = 1 n0310 = 2 n0311 = 2 n0312 = 1 n0313 = 1 n0314 = 1
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – Continued from previous page
nj1j2j3j4 nj1j2j3j4 nj1j2j3j4 nj1j2j3j4 nj1j2j3j4 nj1j2j3j4
n0320 = 1 n0321 = 1 n0322 = 1 n0323 = 1 n0324 = 1 n0400 = 1
n0401 = 1 n0402 = 1 n0403 = 1 n0404 = 1 n0410 = 1 n0411 = 2
n0412 = 1 n0413 = 1 n0414 = 1 n0420 = 1 n0421 = 1 n0422 = 1
n0423 = 1 n0424 = 1 n1000 = 1 n1001 = 1 n1002 = 1 n1003 = 1
n1004 = 1 n1010 = 1 n1011 = 1 n1012 = 2 n1013 = 1 n1014 = 1
n1020 = 1 n1021 = 1 n1022 = 1 n1023 = 1 n1024 = 1 n1100 = 1
n1101 = 1 n1102 = 1 n1103 = 2 n1104 = 1 n1110 = 2 n1111 = 1
n1112 = 1 n1113 = 1 n1114 = 1 n1120 = 1 n1121 = 1 n1122 = 1
n1123 = 1 n1124 = 1 n1200 = 1 n1201 = 2 n1202 = 1 n1203 = 1
n1204 = 1 n1210 = 1 n1211 = 1 n1212 = 1 n1213 = 1 n1214 = 1
n1220 = 1 n1221 = 3 n1222 = 2 n1223 = 1 n1224 = 1 n1300 = 1
n1301 = 1 n1302 = 1 n1303 = 1 n1304 = 1 n1310 = 1 n1311 = 3
n1312 = 1 n1313 = 1 n1314 = 1 n1320 = 1 n1321 = 1 n1322 = 1
n1323 = 1 n1324 = 1 n1400 = 1 n1401 = 1 n1402 = 1 n1403 = 1
n1404 = 2 n1410 = 4 n1411 = 1 n1412 = 1 n1413 = 1 n1414 = 1
n1420 = 1 n1421 = 1 n1422 = 1 n1423 = 1 n1424 = 1 n2000 = 1
n2001 = 1 n2002 = 1 n2003 = 1 n2004 = 1 n2010 = 3 n2011 = 1
n2012 = 1 n2013 = 1 n2014 = 1 n2020 = 1 n2021 = 1 n2022 = 1
n2023 = 2 n2024 = 1 n2100 = 1 n2101 = 1 n2102 = 1 n2103 = 2
n2104 = 1 n2110 = 1 n2111 = 1 n2112 = 1 n2113 = 1 n2114 = 1
n2120 = 1 n2121 = 1 n2122 = 1 n2123 = 1 n2124 = 1 n2200 = 1
n2201 = 2 n2202 = 1 n2203 = 1 n2204 = 1 n2210 = 1 n2211 = 1
n2212 = 1 n2213 = 1 n2214 = 1 n2220 = 1 n2221 = 2 n2222 = 1
n2223 = 1 n2224 = 3 n2300 = 1 n2301 = 1 n2302 = 1 n2303 = 1
n2304 = 1 n2310 = 1 n2311 = 1 n2312 = 1 n2313 = 1 n2314 = 1
n2320 = 1 n2321 = 1 n2322 = 1 n2323 = 1 n2324 = 1 n2400 = 1
n2401 = 1 n2402 = 2 n2403 = 1 n2404 = 1 n2410 = 1 n2411 = 1
n2412 = 1 n2413 = 1 n2414 = 1 n2420 = 1 n2421 = 1 n2422 = 1
n2423 = 1 n2424 = 1 n3000 = 2 n3001 = 1 n3002 = 2 n3003 = 1
n3004 = 1 n3010 = 1 n3011 = 1 n3012 = 1 n3013 = 1 n3014 = 1
n3020 = 1 n3021 = 1 n3022 = 1 n3023 = 3 n3024 = 1 n3100 = 1
n3101 = 1 n3102 = 1 n3103 = 1 n3104 = 1 n3110 = 1 n3111 = 1
n3112 = 2 n3113 = 1 n3114 = 1 n3120 = 1 n3121 = 1 n3122 = 1
n3123 = 1 n3124 = 1 n3200 = 1 n3201 = 1 n3202 = 1 n3203 = 1
n3204 = 1 n3210 = 1 n3211 = 3 n3212 = 1 n3213 = 1 n3214 = 1
n3220 = 1 n3221 = 1 n3222 = 2 n3223 = 1 n3224 = 1 n3300 = 1
n3301 = 1 n3302 = 1 n3303 = 1 n3304 = 2 n3310 = 1 n3311 = 1
n3312 = 1 n3313 = 1 n3314 = 3 n3320 = 1 n3321 = 1 n3322 = 1
n3323 = 2 n3324 = 2 n3400 = 1 n3401 = 1 n3402 = 1 n3403 = 2
n3404 = 1 n3410 = 3 n3411 = 1 n3412 = 1 n3413 = 1 n3414 = 1
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – Continued from previous page
nj1j2j3j4 nj1j2j3j4 nj1j2j3j4 nj1j2j3j4 nj1j2j3j4 nj1j2j3j4
n3420 = 1 n3421 = 1 n3422 = 1 n3423 = 1 n3424 = 1
∑3
j1=0
∑4
j2=0
∑2
j3=0
∑4
j4=0
nj1j2j3j4 = 345 is got according to the above table,
and the α-factor parameters can be easily obtained by Equation 7. For instance,
α2314 =
1
345 . Since there is no assumption that independence among the com-
ponents, the joint probability distribution P (f1, f2, f3, f4) is simply given by the
α-factor parameters, which means P (2, 3, 1, 4) = α2314 =
1
345 .
The survival signature of the complex system in Figure 1 is totally the same
as calculated before as it only depends on the structure of the system. Combining
the joint probability distribution values and their corresponding survival signature,
the survival probability of the system after the CCfs P (Ts > t | CCF ), which
can be calculated by Equation 6, is 461934 . This value is still low, however, it has an
improvement compared with the initial failure event in Case 1.
4.3. Case 3: general α-factor model 2
It can be seen from Case 2 that this system is highly susceptible to common
cause failures, as all combinations of the failed components have occurred in the
past data. There is a more robust system to be analysed in this Case, with past
data can be seen in Table 2.
Table 2: Past data nj1j2j3j4 on the system in Figure 1
nj1j2j3j4 nj1j2j3j4 nj1j2j3j4 nj1j2j3j4 nj1j2j3j4 nj1j2j3j4
n0001 = 16 n0002 = 11 n0003 = 13 n0004 = 6 n0010 = 13 n0011 = 3
n0012 = 2 n0013 = 3 n0014 = 3 n0020 = 13 n0021 = 5 n0022 = 2
n0023 = 4 n0100 = 13 n0101 = 3 n0102 = 3 n0103 = 2 n0104 = 2
n0110 = 2 n0111 = 1 n0120 = 3 n0200 = 13 n0201 = 4 n0202 = 2
n0203 = 1 n0204 = 13 n0210 = 1 n0220 = 3 n0300 = 14 n0301 = 5
n0302 = 2 n0303 = 13 n0304 = 1 n0310 = 3 n0320 = 2 n0400 = 7
n0401 = 3 n0402 = 3 n0403 = 2 n0404 = 1 n0410 = 1 n0420 = 3
n1000 = 17 n1001 = 6 n1002 = 3 n1003 = 4 n1004 = 4 n1010 = 5
n1011 = 1 n1020 = 3 n1100 = 6 n1101 = 2 n1102 = 1 n1110 = 2
n1111 = 1 n1200 = 3 n1201 = 1 n1300 = 6 n1301 = 1 n1400 = 4
n1401 = 1 n1402 = 1 n2000 = 13 n2001 = 5 n2002 = 3 n2003 = 2
n2004 = 2 n2010 = 4 n2011 = 1 n2020 = 4 n2100 = 6 n2101 = 1
n2110 = 1 n2200 = 3 n2300 = 3 n2301 = 1 n3000 = 9 n3001 = 5
n3002 = 3 n3010 = 4 n3020 = 2 n3100 = 3 n3300 = 1 n3301 = 1
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As can be seen from the above table that there is one past event (n1111) that
all component types are affected, and few past data where three types have been
influenced (n0111, n1011, n1101, n1102, n1110, n1201, n1401, n1402, n2011, n2101, n2110,
n2301, n3301 in this case). In other words, this system has the feature that com-
ponents belong to one type are more reliable when CCFs affect the other types.
Therefore, it is unlikely to have large numbers of components of more than two
types fail simultaneously.
Similarly,
∑3
j1=0
∑4
j2=0
∑2
j3=0
∑4
j4=0
nj1j2j3j4 = 345 and the joint probability
distribution P (f1, f2, f3, f4) can be got directly from α-factor parameters, with
P (f1, f2, f3, f4) = αn1n2n3n4 . The survival signature of the system remains the
same as before since its structure does not change at all.
Based on Equation 6, it can be known that P (Ts > t | CCF ) = 439473 , which means
the system survival probability after a common cause failure is around 92.81%. This
is highly improved compared with the former two cases.
4.4. Case 4: imprecision within system
In this subsection, let consider uncertainty in the system reliability analysis after
common cause failures. In Case 1, if the system has not suffered CCF in the past,
there might not be enough data to calculate the α-factor parameters, although the
standard α-factor model can still be implemented by using experts’ judgements.
Given that a total of 20 common cause component failures has occurred across
the complex system in Figure 1, let two groups of experts estimate how the data
would be spread. Suppose group one gives that α11 =
2
5 , α
1
2 =
1
5 and α
1
3 =
2
5 for
components type 1, while for components type 2, α21 = 0, α
2
2 =
2
5 , α
2
3 =
2
5 and α
2
4 =
1
5 . α
3
1 =
2
3 and α
3
2 =
1
3 for components type 3, and for components type 4, α
4
1 =
3
7 ,
α42 =
1
7 , α
4
3 =
2
7 and α
4
4 =
1
7 . At this time, even the survival signature of Φ(2, 3, 2, 3)
remains the same as 4148 , which is a big value within the survival signature. However,
its corresponding P (1, 1, 1, 1) decreases from 148 to 0. Let summarise the products
of P (f1, f2, f3, f4) and their corresponding Φ(m1 − f1,m2 − f2,m3 − f3,m4 − f4),
then the survival probability P (Ts > t | CCF ) of the complex system after the
next CCFs is 623 .
For group two, the estimated data are α11 =
1
2 , α
1
2 =
1
3 , α
1
3 =
1
6 , α
2
1 =
1
4 , α
2
2 =
1
4 ,
α23 =
1
4 , α
2
4 =
1
4 , α
3
1 =
1
2 , α
3
2 =
1
2 , α
4
1 =
3
8 , α
4
2 =
3
8 , α
4
3 =
1
4 and α
4
4 = 0. For this
circumstance, P (1, 1, 1, 1) increases to α11α
2
1α
3
1α
4
1 =
1
2 ∗ 14 ∗ 12 ∗ 38 = 3128 . Therefore,
P (Ts > t | CCF ) = 179456 according to Equation 6.
So due to the epistemic uncertainty in this example, the probability bounds of
the system works after the next common cause failure event is P (Ts > t | CCF ) =
[ 623 ,
3
128 ].
4.5. Results discussion
Common cause failures are the simultaneous failure of multiple similar components
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due to the same root cause, these kind of failures have been shown to decrease the
reliabiliyt and performance of complex systems.33 A common cause failure event
may affect an entire system or only a fraction of its components. Consequently, the
number of components involved in a common cause failure event ranges from 1 to
the total number of components within the same type.
In Case 1, due to the assumptions of the standard α-factor model, the survival
probability of the system is unsatisfactorily low. In order to release these assump-
tions, it is necessary to generalise the α-factor model. Both Case 2 and Case 3
improve from 50139 to
461
934 and
439
473 , respectively. The structure of the system remains
the same for case 2 and case there, and the total number of the past data is identical
to Case 2, but why the vulnerability of the system to CCFs declines so drastically?
It can be investigated that the higher values of P (f1, f2, f3, f4),
17
345 ,
16
345 ,
14
345 ,
13
345
and 11345 , correspond to survival signature Φ(l1, l2, l3, l4) = 1. Therefore, these kinds
of CCFs that are triggered will not be likely to cause system fails. While in Case
2, there are more instances in the past data where larger numbers of components
from more than two types had failed, making it less likely that the system could
continue to work. Case 4 shows that epistemic uncertainty will lead the uncertainty
within the system in this case. In order to reduce the imprecision, engineers need
to put efforts to get the precise α-factor parameters.
5. Conclusions
Common cause failure events have highly adverse impact on the reliability and
availability of systems in the real world, which makes it important to analyse sys-
tems reliability after CCFs. This paper put forwards the survival signature based
reliability analysis on complex systems with common cause failures.
The survival signature is a summary of system structure function, which makes
it is efficient to analyse complex systems. Based on the basic α-factor model, the
paper presents the standard and general α-factor models for analysing complex
system reliability with common cause failures. The effects of epistemic uncertainty
are taken into account as well. What is more, the proposed methods are combined
with the survival signature in order to perform complex system reliability analysis
in the presence of common cause failure events. The feasibility and effectiveness of
the proposed measures are demonstrated by the numerical examples.
The standard α-factor model has the assumptions that (1) the common cause
failure event will affect all the common cause groups of components; and (2) the
failure components are independent. All of which may lead to an unsatisfactory
survival probability of system after a common cause failure event. In practice,
the engineer will have to consider repairing or replacing the failed components
if this kind of circumstance happens. Therefore, the CCFs model combines with
the survival signature can be used to decide whether to repair or replace the failed
components immediately, or after the next common cause failure event. In other
words, the administrator or designer has to consider the cost of repairing or replace
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the components as soon as possible, or taking the risk of allowing next common
cause failure vent to occur before performing the failed components repair or re-
placement. Overall, it is an example of how decision theory is incorporated in the
practical engineering world.
In order to release the assumptions of the former model, the general α-factor
model is introduced. By investigating the two cases which are given for this model,
it can be seen that design for reliability is useful in the engineering world. The
goal of the reliability policy is to achieve high initial reliability by focusing on reli-
ability fundamentals during design. So design for reliability provides engineers and
managers with a range of tools and techniques for incorporating reliability into the
design process for complex systems.34 For complex system, it can examine the sur-
vival signature first, in order to find out which component combinations of failures
will not allow the system to function at all. Therefore, the engineers can ensure
these components are equipped to be more reliable under certain circumstances,
which makes the system more reliable.
A possible challenge of the work presented in this paper is that there may not be
enough past data on the realistic system, which is essential to calculate the precise
values of the α-factor parameters. This is either if the system does not usually
experience the common cause failures, or if the system has not been run in the
past. However, these α-factor models can still be implemented by using experts’
judgements on the system to ascertain the nj1,j2,...,jK values.
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